(Autonomy of) Law and moral disagreement

"Are affirmative action policies just or unjust?" "Should abortion be legal or illegal?" "What is the role of the state on the distribution of wealth?" Several questions could illustrate our constant moral disagreements. In (increasingly) plural, fragmented societies, it is only natural that agents with diverse conceptions regarding moral concepts and propositions disagree among each other. This essay, therefore, under the hermeneutical-phenomenological "method", first, reinterprets (i) Alasdair MacIntyre's comments on the nature of moral disagreement and (ii) Ronald Dworkin's and Jeremy Waldron's different answers on the role of law concerning these disputes. Then it seeks to investigate (i) whether MacIntyre's insights are applicable to jurisprudence and (ii) what is the best account of how law relates to moral disagreement. Our conclusions point to the idea that both a search for a democratic solution to moral disagreements and the best interpretation of our legal practice demand a high level of autonomy of law itself.