We show that rent-seeking contests with shortlisting have comparative static properties which depend on the stage of the contest. By generalising the argument in Amegashie (1997), we show that well-known comparative static results in single-stage rent-seeking contests do not necessarily carry over to contests with shortlisting. The analysis suggests that policy prescriptions for reducing rent-seeking expenditures in contests with shortlisting cannot be given without taking into account the stage of the contest. We also extend the model in Amegashie (1997) to the case of unequal class sizes. Finally, the shortlisting method in Amegashie (1997) is compared with that in Clark and Riis (1996).
机构:
Southwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R ChinaSouthwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
Liu, Baohua
Lin, Yan
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Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Kunming, Yunnan, Peoples R ChinaSouthwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
Lin, Yan
Chan, Kam C.
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机构:
Western Kentucky Univ, Gordon Ford Coll Business, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USASouthwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
机构:
United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Schmitt P.
Shupp R.
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Department of Economics, Ball State University, MuncieUnited States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Shupp R.
Swope K.
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United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Swope K.
Cadigan J.
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Department of Public Administration, American University, Washington, DC 20016, 4400 Mass. Ave., NWUnited States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402