Does common ownership really increase firm coordination? *

被引:66
|
作者
Lewellen, Katharina [1 ]
Lowry, Michelle [2 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Tuck Sch Business, 100 Tuck Dr, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[2] Drexel Univ, LeBow Sch Business, 3220 Market St, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
Common ownership; Institutional ownership; Corporate governance; CROSS-OWNERSHIP; GOVERNANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.03.008
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A growing number of studies suggest that common ownership caused cooperation among firms to increase and competition to decrease. We take a closer look at four approaches used to identify these effects. We find that the effects that some studies have attributed to common ownership are caused by other factors, such as differential responses of firms (or industries) to the 2008 financial crisis. We propose a modification to one of the previously used empirical approaches that is less sensitive to these issues. Using this to re-evaluate the link between common ownership and firm outcomes, we find little robust evidence that common ownership affects firm behavior. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:322 / 344
页数:23
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