Ordeals, inequalities, moral hazard and non-monetary incentives in health care

被引:1
|
作者
Hausman, Daniel M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Philosophy, 600 N Pk St, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
ordeals; moral hazard; non-monetary incentives; inequality;
D O I
10.1017/S0266267120000127
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This essay begins by summarizing the reasons why unregulated health-care markets are inefficient. The inefficiencies stem from the asymmetries of information among providers, patients and payers, which give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection. Attempts to ameliorate these inefficiencies by means of risk-adjusted insurance and monetary incentives such as co-pays and deductibles lessen the inefficiencies at the cost of increasing inequalities. Another possibility is to rely on non-monetary incentives, including ordeals. While not a magic bullet, these are feasible methods for addressing the inadequacies of market provision of health care, such as moral hazard.
引用
收藏
页码:23 / 36
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] The Effect of Non-Monetary Incentives & Work Environment on Employee's Job Satisfaction
    Qader, Abdulkhaleq Nader
    ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMIA APLICADA, 2021, 39 (07):
  • [22] Do monetary and non-monetary incentives influence environmental attitudes and behavior? Evidence from an experimental analysis
    Rajapaksa, Darshana
    Gifford, Robert
    Torgler, Benno
    Garcia-Valinas, Marian
    Athukorala, Wasantha
    Managi, Shunsuke
    Wilson, Clevo
    RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING, 2019, 149 : 168 - 176
  • [23] Non-monetary incentives for pregnant women and antenatal attendance among Ethiopian pastoralists
    Zachariah, R.
    De Smet, M.
    Etienne, W.
    Khogali, M.
    van Den Bergh, R.
    Veerman, R.
    Harries, A. D.
    PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION, 2014, 4 (02): : 133 - 133
  • [25] Non-monetary inequalities in modem Russia: Specifics and dynamics under the crisis of 2020
    Mareeva, Svetlana, V
    TERRA ECONOMICUS, 2021, 19 (04): : 77 - 91
  • [26] NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY PUBLIC GOOD GAME
    Dugar, Subhasish
    ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2013, 51 (02) : 1374 - 1388
  • [27] THE ROLE OF MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES ON THE CHOICE OF PRACTICE ESTABLISHMENT: A STATED PREFERENCE STUDY OF YOUNG PHYSICIANS IN GERMANY
    Guenther, O. H.
    Kuerstein, B.
    Riedel-Heller, S. G.
    Koenig, H. H.
    VALUE IN HEALTH, 2009, 12 (07) : A241 - A241
  • [28] Moral Hazard and Health Care for All
    Burdick, James
    ARCHIVES OF SURGERY, 2008, 143 (10) : 931 - 932
  • [29] Moral Hazard and Modern Health Care
    Allen, Brian
    Chandawarkar, Rajiv Y.
    PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY, 2010, 126 (05) : 280E - 281E
  • [30] MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
    Aron-Dine, Aviva
    Einav, Liran
    Finkelstein, Amy
    Cullen, Mark
    REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 2015, 97 (04) : 725 - 741