Capacity choice in a duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm and an absolute profit-maximizing firm

被引:23
|
作者
Nakamura, Yasuhiko [1 ]
机构
[1] Nihon Univ, Coll Econ, Tokyo 1018360, Japan
关键词
Capacity choice; Consumer-friendly firm; Quantity competition; Price competition; Extent of the importance of consumer surplus; HOLDING EXCESS CAPACITY; MIXED DUOPOLY; DETER ENTRY; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2014.07.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper studies a capacity choice problem in a duopoly with substitutable goods that is composed of one consumer-friendly firm and one standard absolute profit-maximizing firm in the contexts of both quantity competition and price competition with substitutable goods. In this paper, we assume that the consumer-friendly firm maximizes the weighted sum of its absolute profit and consumer surplus. We show that in the quantity competition, for the consumer-friendly firm, under-capacity is chosen when the extent of the importance of consumer surplus to the consumer-friendly firm is high relative to the degree of product differentiation, whereas over-capacity is chosen otherwise. Moreover, we find that in the price competition, the consumer-friendly firm chooses over-capacity when the extent of importance of consumer surplus to the consumer-friendly firm is high relative to the degree of product differentiation, whereas it chooses under-capacity otherwise. Furthermore, regardless of the extent of the importance of consumer surplus to the consumer-friendly firm and the degree of product differentiation, it is shown that in the quantity competition, the absolute profit-maximizing firm chooses over-capacity, whereas in the price competition, it chooses under-capacity. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:105 / 117
页数:13
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