A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING MORAL HAZARD DRIVEN OPERATIONAL RISK

被引:0
|
作者
Anghelache, Gabriela Victoria [1 ]
Cozmanca, Bogdan Octavian [1 ]
Handoreanu, Catalina Adriana [1 ]
Obreja, Carmen [1 ]
Olteanu, Ana Cornelia [1 ]
Radu, Alina Nicoleta [1 ]
机构
[1] Bucharest Acad Econ Studies, Money & Banking Dept, Bucharest, Romania
来源
METALURGIA INTERNATIONAL | 2010年 / 15卷
关键词
operational risk; moral hazard; quantification models; risk aversion; risk premium; MARKETS; CREDIT;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TF [冶金工业];
学科分类号
0806 ;
摘要
Operational risk, together with credit risk and market risk, is a component that is localized within the financial institutions and that have difficulty to he identify and commensurate. Nowadays it is given a greater importance, both at national and European level to the identification, sizing and operational risk management. Thus, the article wants, in addition to the identification of operational risk quantification and modeling, to surprise the impact of the moral hazard. If in practice there are situations where operational risks are underestimated, the present study has proposed to identify potential financial losses caused by internal events of a credit institution. Taking into account all components of the operational risk, with predictable consequences on the financial performance of credit institutions, also it has been addressed their activities as intermediaries in the capital market. In this context the research has reached the issue of risk aversion, also.
引用
收藏
页码:148 / 153
页数:6
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