Anchored strategic reasoning

被引：0
|
作者：
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta [1 ]
Seres, Gyula [2 ]
机构：
[1] Tech Univ Berlin, Fac Econ & Management, Str 17 Juni 135, D-10623 Berlin, Germany
[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Global Asia Inst, 10 Lower Kent Ridge Rd, Singapore 119076, Singapore
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2022年 / 212卷
关键词：
Anchoring bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete information; Strategy; UNCERTAINTY; PERSPECTIVE; AUCTIONS; PRICES; LIMITS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110330
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We propose a model whereby players' beliefs about the opponents' reasoning are anchored to an irrelevant number. The model predicts that strategies are adjusted toward the anchor if they are complements. If strategies are substitutes, adjustments away are also possible. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：5
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