The Dilemma of Labor Unions: Local Objectives vs Global Bargaining

被引：4
|
作者：
Eckel, Carsten [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Egger, Hartmut [3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Munich, Dept Econ, Ludwigstr 28 VG, D-80539 Munich, Germany
[2] CEPR, Washington, DC 20009 USA
[3] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[4] GEP, Freiburg, Germany
[5] Univ Bayreuth, Dept Law & Econ, Univ Str 30, D-95447 Bayreuth, Germany
[6] IfW, Dresden, Germany
来源：
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 25卷 / 03期
关键词：
FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; EMPLOYMENT; WAGES; UNEMPLOYMENT; ECONOMY; OLIGOPOLY; MARKET; LIBERALIZATION;
D O I：
10.1111/roie.12273
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
It is a widespread concern that multinational enterprises improve their disagreement profits by setting up foreign production facilities, with adverse consequences for negotiated wages and union utilities. In this paper, we take a new angle on this issue and analyze whether unions can improve their situation by cooperating internationally. Our results show that cooperation is clearly beneficial for unions if their preferences regarding wages and employment are similar across countries. If these preferences differ, however, potential production reallocations by multinationals create winners and losers among unions, and this may impede cooperation of unions within the multinational production network.
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页码：534 / 566
页数：33
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