A Performance-Based Incentives System for Village Health Workers in Kisoro, Uganda

被引:11
|
作者
Zheng, Crystal [1 ]
Musominali, Sam [2 ]
Chaw, Gloria Fung [3 ]
Paccione, Gerald [3 ]
机构
[1] Tulane Univ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[2] Doctors Global Hlth, Kampala, Uganda
[3] Albert Einstein Coll Med, Bronx, NY 10467 USA
来源
ANNALS OF GLOBAL HEALTH | 2019年 / 85卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.5334/aogh.2400
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
Background: Village health worker (VHW) programs in Uganda have achieved limited success, due in part to a reliance on volunteerism and a lack of standardized incentive mechanisms. However, how to best incentivize VHWs remains unclear. Doctors for Global Health developed a performance-based incentives (PBI) system to pay its VHWs in Kisoro, Uganda, based on performance of tasks or achievement of targets. Objectives: 1. To describe the development of a PBI system used to compensate VHWs. 2. To report cost and health services delivery outcomes under a PBI system. 3. To provide qualitative analysis on the successes and challenges of PBI. Methods: Internal organization records from May 2016 to April 2017 were retrospectively reviewed. The results of descriptive and analytic statistics were reported. Qualitative analysis was performed by the authors. Findings: In one year, 42 VHWs performed 23,703 remunerable health actions, such as providing care of minor ailments and chronic disease. VHWs earned on average $237. The total cost to maintain the program was $29,844, or $0.72 per villager. There was 0% VHW attrition. Strengths of PBI included flexibility, accountability, higher VHW earnings, and improved monitoring and evaluation. Conclusions: PBI is a feasible and sustainable model of compensating VHWs. At a time where VHW programs are sorely needed to address limitations in healthcare resources, yet are facing challenges with workforce compensation, PBI may serve as a model for others in Uganda and around the world.
引用
收藏
页数:9
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Quantifying effects of incentives in a rail maintenance performance-based contract
    Stenbeck, Torbjoern
    JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2008, 134 (04) : 265 - 272
  • [32] Performance-Based Financial Incentives for Diabetes Care: An Effective Strategy?
    Latham, Lesley P.
    Marshall, Emily Gard
    CANADIAN JOURNAL OF DIABETES, 2015, 39 (01) : 83 - 87
  • [33] The effect of horizontal pay dispersion on the effectiveness of performance-based incentives
    Grabner, Isabella
    Martin, Melissa A.
    ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY, 2021, 88
  • [34] Performance-based documentation system
    Anon
    Elevator World, 1997, 45 (09):
  • [35] Viewpoints of pregnant mothers and community health workers on antenatal care in Lweza village, Uganda
    Delzer, Mackenzie E.
    Kkonde, Anthony
    McAdams, Ryan M.
    PLOS ONE, 2021, 16 (02):
  • [36] Review of performance-based incentives in community-based family planning programmes
    Bellows, Nicole M.
    Askew, Ian
    Bellows, Benjamin
    JOURNAL OF FAMILY PLANNING AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE, 2015, 41 (02): : 146 - 151
  • [37] Barriers in the performance-based payment in Iran health system: Challenges and solutions
    Hadian, Marziye
    Rezapour, Aziz
    Mazaheri, Elaheh
    Asiabar, Ali Sarabi
    JOURNAL OF EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, 2021, 10 (01)
  • [38] Strengthening performance-based financing as a health system approach for quality improvement
    Zeng, Wu
    Sun, Daxin
    Nair, Dinesh
    Nam, Jae Eun
    Gheorghe, Adrian
    JOURNAL OF GLOBAL HEALTH, 2018, 8 (02)
  • [39] Performance-Based Payment Incentives Increase Burden And Blame For Hospital Nurses
    Kurtzman, Ellen T.
    O'Leary, Dennis
    Sheingold, Brenda H.
    Devers, Kelly J.
    Dawson, Ellen M.
    Johnson, Jean E.
    HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2011, 30 (02) : 211 - 218
  • [40] The effects of forecast type and performance-based incentives on the quality of management forecasts
    Chen, Clara Xiaoling
    Rennekamp, Kristina M.
    Zhou, Flora H.
    ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY, 2015, 46 : 8 - 18