Corporate governance and procyclicality in a banking crisis: Empirical evidence and implications

被引：2
|
作者：
Ibanez-Hernandez, Francisco J. [1 ]
Pena-Cerezo, Miguel A. [2 ]
Araujo-de-la-Mata, Andres [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Fac Econ & Business, Avda Lehendakari Agirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain
[2] Fac Econ & Business, Comandante Izarduy Kalea 23, Vitoria 01006, Araba, Spain
[3] GPAC, Avda Lehendakari Agirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain
来源：
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2019年 / 30卷
关键词：
Financial crisis; Bank bailout; Procyclicality; Corporate governance; Politically motivated lending; Connected lending; CREDIT BOOMS; GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP; FINANCIAL CRISES; RISK; POLITICIANS; CYCLES; BOARD;
D O I：
10.1016/j.frl.2018.10.011
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper presents our analysis of a complete financial data set on the population of Spanish deposit institutions for the last credit cycle. This information is combined with details about the characteristics of the corporate governance of the banks. Our results show that in a context of rapid credit growth (2002-2007), only financial institutions managed with political criteria have eventually experienced serious solvency problems (2008-2017) and have finally had to be bailed out with public resources. These results are particularly relevant for the establishment of appropriate prudential policies in countries where a government-owned banking system still exists.
引用
收藏
页码：271 / 275
页数：5
相关论文
共 50 条
12345