机构:
Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, JapanWaseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
Yokote, Koji
[1
]
Funaki, Yukihiko
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机构:
Waseda Univ, Fac Polit Sci & Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, JapanWaseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
Funaki, Yukihiko
[2
]
论文数: 引用数:
h-index:
机构:
Kamijo, Yoshio
[3
]
机构:
[1] Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
[2] Waseda Univ, Fac Polit Sci & Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Math, MTA BCE Lendulet Strateg Interact Res Grp, H-1093 Budapest, HungaryCorvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Math, MTA BCE Lendulet Strateg Interact Res Grp, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary