Uncertain two-echelon green supply chain models based on revenue sharing contract

In the present paper, we consider a two-echelon supply chain problem including a manufacturer selling green products to a retailer, and then selling to customers. The market base, customer demand, production cost, and sensitivity to price are recognized as uncertain variables due to the influence of many human factors in reality. The aim is to maximize the entire profit of the supply chain, improve the greening level of products, and solve the contradiction between economic growth, resource protection and ecological environment. Retailer-led and bargaining expected value game models with revenue sharing contract are established. The market demand is affected by retail price and greening level. The revenue sharing contract and its parameters are designed to achieve perfect coordination of the established supply chain models. Some inferences about the optimal decision variables are obtained. Finally, numerical experiments suggest that the revenue sharing contract raises the greening level and reduces the retail price significantly compared to the decentralized decision model.