Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets

被引：12
|
作者：
Jensen, H
机构：
[1] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
[2] Univ Copenhagen, EPRU, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 44卷 / 03期
关键词：
monetary policy cooperation; central bank independence; monetary institutions; performance contracts; policy targets;
D O I：
10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: E42; E58; F42.
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页码：517 / 539
页数：23
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