Does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking?

被引：38

作者：

Niinimaki, J. -P. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Helsinki Sch Econ, Dept Econ, FIN-00101 Helsinki, Finland

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2009年 / 33卷 / 03期

关键词：

Collateral; Subprime lending; Financial crises; Deposit insurance; Moral hazard; RISK-TAKING; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; MARKET; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.008

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral (real estate) generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent. The bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value. If the collateral value later appreciates, the bank enjoys handsome profits: otherwise, the bank fails, The findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：514 / 521

页数：8

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