Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage?

被引:66
|
作者
Ellul, Andrew [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Panayides, Marios [4 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[2] Univ Naples Federico II, Ctr Studies Econ & Finance, Naples, Italy
[3] European Corp Governance Inst, Brussels, Belgium
[4] Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
关键词
SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS; TRADING RESTRICTIONS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OF-INTEREST; PRICES; MARKET; FIRMS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109017000990
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
By collecting and disseminating price-sensitive information, financial analysts should reduce firm insiders' informational advantage with a consequent impact on trading dynamics and market quality. We empirically examine the impact of complete analysts' coverage termination on stocks' liquidity, price discovery, and insider trading profitability. Termination leads to deteriorating liquidity and price efficiency, more informed trading, and higher profitability of insider trades. The magnitude of these effects depends on the strength of insiders' ownership and on management's decision whether to improve the firm's information environment after coverage termination. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the negative effects of termination.
引用
收藏
页码:203 / 241
页数:39
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