The design of rent-seeking competitions: Committees, preliminary, and final contests: Corrigendum

被引：0

|

作者：

Amegashie, J. Atsu ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Guelph, Dept Econ, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2006年 / 129卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Public Choice; Preliminary Stage; Aggregate Expenditure; Unit Reduction; High Quality Standard;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-006-9032-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：321 / 322

页数：2

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