Controlling shareholders, board structure, and firm performance: Evidence from India

被引:83
|
作者
Jameson, Melvin [1 ]
Prevost, Andrew [2 ]
Puthenpurackal, John [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nevada, Dept Finance, Lee Business Sch, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA
[2] Ohio Univ, Coll Business, Dept Finance, Athens, OH 45701 USA
关键词
Controlling shareholders; Family control; Board structure; Corporate governance; India; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; MARKET VALUATION; BUSINESS GROUPS; COMPENSATION; DETERMINANTS; DIRECTORS; MANAGERS; SIZE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the prevalence and performance impact of controlling shareholders and study corporate board structures and ownership structures in 1796 Indian firms. Families (founders) are present on the boards in 63.2 (65.5) percent of the sample firms. On average, founders own over 50% of outstanding shares. In contrast to the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003) in the U.S. context, we find that controlling shareholder board membership in Indian firms has a statistically significant negative association with Tobin's Q., Higher proportion of independent directors, higher institutional ownership or larger firm size does not appear to mitigate this relationship. Overall, board membership of controlling shareholders appears to be costly for minority shareholders. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:1 / 20
页数:20
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