Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

被引：1

作者：

Laskar, Daniel ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CNRS, Paris Sch Econ, UMR 8545, Paris, France

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 122卷 / 02期

关键词：

Global game; Ambiguity; Coordination; Equilibrium selection; Financial crises; FULFILLING CURRENCY ATTACKS; EXPECTED UTILITY; EQUILIBRIUM; PROBABILITY; RISK;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：317 / 320

页数：4

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