Abatement, Care, and Compliance by Firms in Financial Distress

被引:5
|
作者
Evans, Mary F. [1 ]
Gilpatric, Scott M. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Claremont Mckenna Coll, Robert Day Sch Econ & Finance, 500 E Ninth St, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
[2] Univ Tennessee, Dept Econ, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[3] Univ Tennessee, Ctr Corp Governance, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
来源
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 66卷 / 04期
关键词
Insolvency; Compliance; Abatement; Judgment proof; Liability; Care; Concealment; OPTIMAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT; STRICT LIABILITY; POLLUTION; BANKRUPTCY; SAFETY; POLICY; INVESTMENT; PRECAUTION; INSURANCE; INJURERS;
D O I
10.1007/s10640-015-9972-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine precautionary behavior, specifically compliance with environmental regulations, pollution abatement, and care spending, by firms facing two sources of insolvency risk. If poor profit or a liability triggers insolvency, then the firm forgoes a profitable future. The behavioral implications of this survival motive vary across firms. Firms for whom the principal insolvency risk is liability-related now choose precaution above the level chosen by the solvent firm. For firms whose primary insolvency risk is profit-related, the survival motive reinforces incentives for care below the solvent benchmark arising from the familiar judgment-proof effect. We also characterize how insolvency risks affect incentives to conceal adverse events linked to these choices, such as an accident or a regulatory violation. An understanding of these incentives is particularly important during recessionary periods when firms struggle to survive the downturn.
引用
收藏
页码:765 / 794
页数:30
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