CBRN incidents: Political regimes, perpetrators, and targets

被引:13
|
作者
Ivanova, Kate
Sandler, Todd
机构
[1] Univ Texas, Sch Social Sci, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
[2] Univ So Calif, Sch Int Relat, Los Angeles, CA USA
关键词
CBRN terrorism; political regimes; rule of law; failed states; fundamentalist terrorism; cults; nationalists; odds ratio test;
D O I
10.1080/09546550600752014
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
This article investigates the relationship between regime characteristics and the likelihood of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents. Odds ratios establish that democratic ideals-democratic rule, strong rule of law, and honest regimes-are associated with more CBRN incidents. Failed states may be where some terrorist groups form or take refuge, but these states have not been the venue of choice for CBRN incidents. Religious (cults and fundamentalists) and nationalist/separatist groups are not more likely than others to engage in CBRN attacks. To date, indiscriminate CBRN attacks are as likely as discriminate attacks to cause casualties. Transnational terrorist groups are less adept than others in concealing their acquisition of CBRN substances. For some regressions, democratic rule and strong rule of law are positive determinants of CBRN incidents.
引用
收藏
页码:423 / 448
页数:26
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