Votes and Regional Economic Growth: Evidence from Turkey

被引：13
|
作者：
Luca, Davide [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
来源：
WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2016年 / 78卷
关键词：
distributive politics; votes; political cleavages; regional economic growth; Middle-East; Turkey; STRUCTURAL FUNDS; PORK-BARREL; POLITICS; POLICY; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; PARTIES; STATE; DECENTRALIZATION; REDISTRIBUTION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.033
中图分类号：
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号：
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要：
In countries where governments' disproportionate power over the bureaucracy is coupled with a strong political polarization, can votes for the national incumbent party "buy" preferential policy treatment and faster regional economic growth? The article tests such question on Turkey's 81 provinces over 2004-12. Results uncover a link between votes and faster regional growth, as well as a small influence of preferential allocations in explaining it. Yet, after addressing potential endogeneity, economic performance is almost entirely explained by standard drivers, primarily human capital endowment. Results suggest that the impact of electorally motivated distributive politics on regions' economic performance is extremely limited. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码：477 / 495
页数：19
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