Why do loans contain covenants? Evidence from lending relationships

被引：74
|
作者：
Prilmeier, Robert [1 ]
机构：
[1] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 123卷 / 03期
关键词：
Relationships; Banking; Covenants; Information asymmetries; Monitoring incentives; CONTROL RIGHTS; DEBT; DESIGN; CHOICE; IMPACT; RISK;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.12.007
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Despite the importance of banks' role as delegated monitors, little is known about how non-price terms of loan contracts are structured to optimize information production in a lending relationship. Using a large sample of corporate loans, this paper examines the effect of relationship lending on covenant choice. Consistent with information asymmetry theories, covenant tightness is relaxed over the duration of a relationship, especially for opaque borrowers. In contrast, the effect of lending relationship intensity on the number of covenants included in a loan follows an inverted U shape. I discuss potential explanations for this finding. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：558 / 579
页数：22
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