A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

被引：0
|
作者：
Volij, O [1 ]
机构：
[1] Iowa State Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2002年 / 44卷 / 01期
关键词：
bargaining; compound lotteries; dynamic consistency;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：17 / 24
页数：8
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