We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Western Ontario, Social Sci Ctr, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 3K7, CanadaUniv Western Ontario, Social Sci Ctr, Dept Econ, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
Segal, U
UNCERTAIN DECISIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS,
1999,
: 39
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