All voting is strategic

被引：6

作者：

Buchanan, James M. ^{[1
]}

Yoon, Yong J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] George Mason Univ, Ctr Study Publ Choice, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2006年 / 129卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-006-9021-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence.

引用

页码：159 / 167

页数：9

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