Bargaining model of labor disputes considering social mediation and bounded rationality

被引:8
|
作者
Liu, Dehai [1 ,2 ]
Lv, Wei [1 ]
Li, Hongyi [3 ]
Tang, Jiafu [2 ]
机构
[1] Dongbei Univ Finance & Econ, Ctr Ind & Business Org, Dalian 116025, Liaoning, Peoples R China
[2] Dongbei Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Dalian 116025, Liaoning, Peoples R China
[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Business Sch, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
OR in developing countries; Labor dispute mass emergency; Social mediation; Bounded rationality; M-P solution; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.04.003
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Due to the characteristics of bounded rationality for labor dispute mass emergencies in China, the Perles Maschler (M-P) solution is applied to analyze the bargaining process between the employer and the employees. Considering that social mediation is a treatment method for labor dispute mass emergencies with Chinese characteristics, this paper compares the Nash solution for social mediation, the Kalai Smorodinsky (K-S) solution for rational bargaining based on bargaining power, and the M P solution for bounded rationality search. The results show that the final outcome for labor disputes not only depends on the different treatment models but also has the feature of "path dependence". The Nash solution for social mediation can reach an outcome that benefits both the employees and the employer. By taking advantage of the social mediation in labor capital conflicts and building a three-party mechanism for labor unions to take part in the negotiation, we can obtain a win win outcome that can maintain both the employees' benefits and rights, and the employer's productivity as well. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1064 / 1071
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Passivity-Based Analysis and Nudging Design for Dynamic Social Model with Bounded Rationality
    Yamashita, Shunya
    Hatanaka, Takeshi
    Wasa, Yasuaki
    Hayashi, Naoki
    Hirata, Kenji
    Uchida, Kenko
    IFAC PAPERSONLINE, 2020, 53 (05): : 338 - 343
  • [32] Implicit stereotypes and memory: The bounded rationality of social beliefs
    Banaji, MR
    Bhaskar, R
    MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF, 2000, : 139 - 175
  • [33] Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement
    Gsottbauer, Elisabeth
    van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M.
    INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS-POLITICS LAW AND ECONOMICS, 2013, 13 (03) : 225 - 249
  • [34] The dynamics of Bowley's model with bounded rationality
    Agiza, HN
    Hegazi, AS
    Elsadany, AA
    CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2001, 12 (09) : 1705 - 1717
  • [35] Oligopolistic quantity competition with bounded rationality and social comparison
    Li, Yan
    Chen, Yefen
    Shou, Biying
    Zhao, Xiaobo
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2019, 211 : 180 - 196
  • [36] Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks
    Kasthurirathna, Dharshana
    Harre, Michael
    Piraveenan, Mahendra
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 IEEE/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN SOCIAL NETWORKS ANALYSIS AND MINING (ASONAM 2015), 2015, : 33 - 40
  • [37] A memory-based model of bounded rationality
    Mullainathan, S
    QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2002, 117 (03): : 735 - 774
  • [38] Dynamics of Hotelling triopoly model with bounded rationality
    Peng, Yu
    Lu, Qian
    Wu, Xue
    Zhao, Yueru
    Xiao, Yue
    APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2020, 373
  • [39] THE GARBLING DECISION MAKER - A MODEL OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
    PAPADOPOULOS, NM
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 1980, 25 (03) : 577 - 579
  • [40] Learning by helping: a bounded rationality model of mentoring
    Arai, M
    Billot, A
    Lanfranchi, J
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2001, 45 (02) : 113 - 131