The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings

被引：671

作者：

Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis

Collins, Daniel W. ^{[1
]}

LaFond, Ryan

机构：

[1] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA

[2] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI USA

[3] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 42卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

corporate governance; credit rating; executive compensation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. We document, after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. We also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：203 / 243

页数：41

共 53 条

[11]

Bhagat S., 2000, 143 CLES

[12] Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors [J].

Bhojraj, S ;

Sengupta, P .

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 2003, 76 (03) :455-475

[13] FACTORS AFFECTING SEASONED CORPORATE BOND PRICES [J].

BOARDMAN, CM ;

MCENALLY, RW .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1981, 16 (02) :207-226

[14] Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems [J].

Bushman, R ;

Chen, Q ;

Engel, E ;

Smith, A .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2004, 37 (02) :167-201

[15] Client importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals [J].

Chung, HS ;

Kallapur, S .

ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2003, 78 (04) :931-955

[16] Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance [J].

Core, JE ;

Holthausen, RW ;

Larcker, DF .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1999, 51 (03) :371-406

[17] STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS, PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED STOCK REPURCHASES, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE-CONTROL [J].

DANN, LY ;

DEANGELO, H .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1983, 11 (1-4) :275-300

[18]

Davidson W., 2004, J ACCOUNT PUBLIC POL, V23, P279, DOI DOI 10.1016/J.JACCPUBPOL.2004.06.001

[19]

DeAngelo L., 1981, J ACCOUNT ECON, V3, P183, DOI [10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1]

[20] The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors [J].

Dechow, PM ;

Dichev, ID .

ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2002, 77 :35-59

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →