The Implementation Duality

被引:23
|
作者
Noeldeke, Georg [1 ]
Samuelson, Larry [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, Basel, Switzerland
[2] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Implementation; conjugate duality; Galois connection; optimal transport; imperfectly transferable utility; principal-agent model; two-sided matching; PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS; ADVERSE SELECTION; MATCHING MODELS; EXISTENCE; INFORMATION; CORE; MECHANISMS; MARRIAGE; TAXATION; MARKET;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA13307
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more abstract duality relationship, known as a Galois connection, takes the role of (generalized) conjugate duality. While weaker, this duality relationship still induces substantial structure. We show that this structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems without quasilinearity.
引用
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页码:1283 / 1324
页数:42
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