Platform for Verification of Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks against Cryptographic Circuits

被引:14
|
作者
Yoshikawa, Masaya [1 ]
Asai, Toshiya [1 ]
机构
[1] Meijo Univ, Dept Informat Engn, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan
关键词
component; Electromagnetic analysis attacks; Cryptographic circuit; Evaluation platform; POWER-ANALYSIS; DESIGN FLOW;
D O I
10.1109/ITNG.2013.101
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The threat of electromagnetic analysis attacks against cryptographic circuits is now becoming more evident. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the resistance of cryptographic circuits to electromagnetic analysis attacks at the design stage. In order to analyze electromagnetic waves at the design stage, an electromagnetic field simulator must be used. However, since electromagnetic analysis attacks use many waveforms, the use of an electromagnetic field simulator is not realistic from the standpoint of the processing time. The present study develops a verification platform to evaluate the vulnerability of cryptographic circuits to electromagnetic analysis attacks at the design stage. In the present study, a macro model for each element to be attacked is prepared. Using the results obtained by simulating each macro model and current, high-speed electromagnetic wave analysis is realized. The validity of the proposed method is verified by performing evaluation experiments.
引用
收藏
页码:653 / 658
页数:6
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