Symbolic Politics and the Regulation of Executive Compensation: A Comparison of the Great Depression and the Great Recession

When politicians feel popular pressure to act, but are unwilling or unable to address the root cause of the problem, they resort to symbolic policymaking. In this paper, I examine excessive executive compensation as an issue that rose to the top of the political agenda during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Presidential candidates, members of Congress, the media, and the public alike blamed corporate greed for the economic downturn. In both instances, however, enacted legislation stopped short of changing the way in which executive pay was determined or placing effective, enforceable limits on it. I analyze the nature of the democratic process and contend that public policy scholars need to pay more attention to the occurrence of symbolic policies. The category of symbolic policies offers a more accurate approach to understanding the politics of executive compensation in the United States during the two crises and helps explain why, in spite of the recent legislative efforts, it continues to rise. © 2013 SAGE Publications.