Moral hazard, vertical integration, and public monitoring in credence goods

被引:34
|
作者
Vetter, H
Karantininis, K
机构
[1] Royal Vet & Agr Univ KVL, Dept Econ & Nat Resources, DK-1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark
[2] Statsbibliotek Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark
关键词
credence goods; moral hazard; vertical integration;
D O I
10.1093/eurrag/29.2.271
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Moral hazard is a problem in markets where the qualities or characteristics of products cannot be verified with certainty by consumers. Here we demonstrate that vertical integration is one possible way of dealing with such problems. When the saving of monitoring costs is the driving force behind vertical integration, public monitoring freely available to the market may prevent vertical integration.
引用
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页码:271 / 279
页数:9
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