PERSUASION BY CAUSAL ARGUMENTS: THE MOTIVATING ROLE OF PERCEIVED CAUSAL EXPERTISE

被引:21
|
作者
Tobin, Stephanie J. [1 ]
Raymundo, Melissa M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Houston, Dept Psychol, Houston, TX 77204 USA
关键词
UNCERTAINTY; EXPLANATION; INFORMATION; ATTITUDE; BELIEFS;
D O I
10.1521/soco.2009.27.1.105
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
We examined how perceived causal expertise affects the processing of causal persuasive arguments. In Study 1, participants received strong or weak causal arguments from a content-area expert who was high or low in causal expertise. Participants in the high causal expertise condition processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In Study 2, participants received a high or low causal confidence prime and then read a message from a source who was high or low in content-area expertise. The message contained strong or weak, causal or non-causal arguments. Participants who received both the causal confidence prime and the high content-area expertise information processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. These findings demonstrate that causal and content-area expertise can increase motivation to attend to causal arguments. Implications for the persuasion literature are discussed.
引用
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页码:105 / 127
页数:23
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