Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

被引:10
|
作者
Castiglionesi, Fabio [1 ]
Feriozzi, Fabio [2 ]
Loranth, Gyoengyi [3 ]
Pelizzon, Loriana [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Finance, CentER, European Banking Ctr, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] IE Univ, IE Business Sch, Segovia, Spain
[3] Univ Vienna, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
[4] Ca Foscari Univ Venice, Venice, Italy
[5] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
interbank markets; G21; liquidity coinsurance; bank capital; MORAL HAZARD; MARKET; REQUIREMENTS; RISK;
D O I
10.1111/jmcb.12111
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self-insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.
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页码:409 / 443
页数:35
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