REGULATION AS DELEGATION

被引:5
|
作者
Bar-Gill, Oren [1 ]
Sunstein, Cass R. [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Law & Econ, 1525 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; PREFERENCES; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; AUTHORITY; CONTRACTS; DECISION; SAVINGS; AGENTS; RULES;
D O I
10.1093/jla/lav005
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
In diverse areas-from retirement savings, to fuel economy, to prescription drugs, to consumer credit, to food and beverage consumption-government makes personal decisions for us or helps us make what it sees as better decisions. In other words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory and Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory, a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from personal decisions to public goods problems, we introduce the idea of reverse delegation, with the government as principal and the individuals as agents.
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页码:1 / 36
页数:36
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