DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND FIRM VALUE

被引:51
|
作者
Hwang, Joon Ho [1 ]
Kim, Byungmo [2 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Dankook Univ, Dept Business Adm, Yongin, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; RISK-TAKING; PANEL-DATA; INVESTOR PROTECTION; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12136
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the effect of directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance on firm value. Previous studies are divided on the value implication of D&O insurance: some argue for various benefits of being covered by D&O insurance, whereas others focus on the managerial opportunism stemming from being insured. In order to address whether D&O insurance increases firm value, we utilize a sample of quoted Korean companies from a period in which the disclosure of D&O insurance information was mandatory and there was a significant cross-sectional variation in the firms' coverage of D&O insurance. We find that controlling for the endogeneity of D&O insurance coverage, D&O insurance increases firm value compared to noninsured firms. We also find evidence that the increase in firm value is pronounced for firms with greater growth opportunities, which suggests that D&O insurance can help firms to better convert growth opportunities into higher firm value.
引用
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页码:447 / 482
页数:36
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