Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard

被引：111

作者：

Manning, WG ^{[1
]}

Marquis, MS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] RAND CORP,WASHINGTON,DC 20005

来源：

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 15卷 / 05期

关键词：

insurance; moral hazard; second-best pricing; demand for health care;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00497-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

引用

页码：609 / 639

页数：31

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