Student admissions and faculty recruitment

被引：9
|
作者：
Baïou, M
Balinski, M
机构：
[1] Ecole Polytech, Lab Econometrie, F-75005 Paris, France
[2] Univ Clermont Ferrand, CUST, F-63174 Aubiere, France
[3] CNRS, Paris, France
来源：
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE | 2004年 / 322卷 / 02期
关键词：
stable assignment; college admissions; stable marriage; stable matching; two-sided market; many-to-one matching; mechanism design;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tcs.2004.03.011
中图分类号：
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号：
081202 ;
摘要：
The student admissions and faculty recruitment problems are modeled and analyzed in terms of graphs. Stable assignments, potentially exponential in number, form a distributive lattice whose sup and inf are the applicant-optimal and university-optimal stable assignments, mu(A) and mu(U). Which one of all possible stable assignments should be chosen in practice is answered in these terms: mu(A) is characterized as the unique choice mechanism that is either "monotone," or "strategy-proof," or "efficient." Similar characterizations are given for mu(U), though as a practical matter they are not persuasive. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：245 / 265
页数：21
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