BANKING AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOO BIG TO FAIL

被引:3
|
作者
Kaufman, George G. [1 ]
机构
[1] Loyola Univ, Dept Finance, Chicago, IL 60611 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/ecin.12169
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Too big to fail (TBTF) is a major policy issue in banking. Large bank failures may impose losses on depositors and creditors that may impose large collateral damage on other financial institutions and beyond. Regulators are frequently incentivized either to delay recognizing a bank's insolvency or fail the bank but protect its creditors against loss. This paper argues that, while there is wide agreement that the cost of protecting creditors in the resolution of large financial institutions is excessively high, it is difficult to prevent this practice for a number of reasons. Until these disagreements are settled, TBTF will survive. (JEL G01, G18, G28)
引用
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页码:1 / 8
页数:8
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