Davidson's fear of the subjective (Donald Davidson)

被引:0
|
作者
Tumulty, Maura [1 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
来源
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2006年 / 44卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00016.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson's own work on thought-attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson's negative reaction to Gareth Evans's works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn't slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy rather than an externalist ally, and suggests that Evans's work could play an important role in furthering Davidson's distinctive externalism.
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页码:509 / 532
页数:24
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