Liquidity, efficiency, and bank bailouts

被引:91
|
作者
Gorton, G [1 ]
Huang, LX
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19041 USA
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2004年 / 94卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0002828041464650
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Governments can efficiently provide liquidity, as when the banking system is bailed out. We study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date. Agents sometimes want to sell projects. The market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity, which is determined in general equilibrium. While private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations, it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante. There is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities.
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页码:455 / 483
页数:29
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