Contracts: The Theory of Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships and the Continuous-Time Approach

被引：0

作者：

Sannikov, Yuliy ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, VOL I: ECONOMIC THEORY | 2013年 / 49期

关键词：

SECURITY DESIGN; MORAL HAZARD; FIRM; COMPENSATION;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：89 / 124

页数：36

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