Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach

被引：1
|
作者：
Rosenmuller, J
机构：
[1] Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, 33501 Bielefeld
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 1997年 / 42卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1023/A:1004907606204
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.
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页码：105 / 146
页数：42
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