An Empirical Analysis of Information Asymmetry in Home Equity Lending

被引:3
|
作者
Agarwal, Sumit [1 ]
Chomsisengphet, Souphala [2 ]
Liu, Chunlin [3 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, 15 Kent Ridge Dr, Singapore 119245, Singapore
[2] Off Comptroller Currency, 400 7th St SW, Washington, DC 20219 USA
[3] Univ Nevada, Reno, NV 89557 USA
关键词
Asymmetric information; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Banking; Home equity lending; CREDIT CARD MARKET; IMPERFECT INFORMATION; PRIVATE INFORMATION; MORAL HAZARD; LOAN; CONSUMPTION; BEHAVIOR; QUALITY; RATINGS; RISK;
D O I
10.1007/s10693-015-0216-z
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze more than 74,000 home equity loans and lines of credit to study the role of information asymmetry. This credit market is characterized by borrowers who face a menu of contract options with varying collateral requirements and prices. Our results show that a less credit worthy applicant is more likely to select a credit contract that requires less collateral. Further analysis on the borrower's repayment behavior after controlling for observable risk attributes indicates that the lender faces adverse selection and moral hazard due to private information.
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页码:101 / 119
页数:19
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