机构:
Columbia Business Sch, Free & Competit Enterprise, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY USAColumbia Business Sch, Free & Competit Enterprise, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY USA
Jiang, Wei
[1
]
Li, Tao
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business, Gainesville, FL 32611 USAColumbia Business Sch, Free & Competit Enterprise, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY USA
Li, Tao
[2
]
Mei, Danqing
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY USAColumbia Business Sch, Free & Competit Enterprise, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY USA
Mei, Danqing
[3
]
机构:
[1] Columbia Business Sch, Free & Competit Enterprise, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY USA
[2] Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
A relatively understudied activist investor strategy is to purchase shares in the acquirer after an M&A announcement and exercise shareholder rights to change deal terms, or even to block the deal, through public campaigns. We provide new evidence on how the strategy affects target firms and activists' returns. Activists tend to target deals involving defense mechanisms, and smaller acquirers with a history of low returns on invested capital. By blocking some deals and pushing other acquirers to lower their bids, such an "activist arbitrage" strategy yields significant returns and serves as a governance antidote to value-destroying acquisitions.