In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are ill dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium ill undominated strategies. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Xian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Int Business Sch Suzhou, Xian 215123, Jiangsu, Peoples R ChinaXian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Int Business Sch Suzhou, Xian 215123, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
Fu, Haifeng
Yu, Haomiao
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Ryerson Univ, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, CanadaXian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Int Business Sch Suzhou, Xian 215123, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
机构:
Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 79 Suyuan Ave, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R ChinaSoutheast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 79 Suyuan Ave, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
Li, Peixuan
Dang, Chuangyin
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Syst Engn, Kowloon, Tat Chee Ave, Hong Kong 999077, Peoples R ChinaSoutheast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 79 Suyuan Ave, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
Dang, Chuangyin
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr & Operat Res, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, NetherlandsSoutheast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 79 Suyuan Ave, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China