Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

被引：48
|
作者：
Rosenberg, Dinah [2 ,3 ]
Solan, Eilon [1 ]
Vieille, Nicolas [4 ]
机构：
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Math Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Univ Paris 13, Inst Galilee, Lab Anal Geometrie & Applicat, F-93430 Villetaneuse, France
[3] Ecole Polytech, Lab Econometrie, F-75005 Paris, France
[4] HEC, Dept Finance & Econ, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 66卷 / 02期
关键词：
STRATEGIC EXPERIMENTATION; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; COMMUNICATION; DISAGREE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：979 / 994
页数：16
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