Nonbinding Peer Review and Effort in Teams Evidence from a Field Experiment

被引:0
|
作者
Behrens, Kristian [1 ,2 ]
Chemin, Matthieu [3 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Quebec Montreal, Dept Econ, Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Natl Res Univ Higher Sch Econ, Moscow, Russia
[3] McGill Univ, Dept Econ, Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[4] CIREQ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[5] CIRANO, Montreal, PQ, Canada
基金
加拿大魁北克医学研究基金会;
关键词
SOCIAL FACILITATION; ASSOCIATION; PRESSURE; DOMINANT; MODEL;
D O I
10.3368/jhr.55.4.0717-8907R2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Individuals tend to free-ride in teams, thus providing inefficiently low effort. We implement a system of confidential peer review in a randomly selected set of teams, whereby teammates complete an online survey to review the effort of their peers. These reviews are not linked to any rewards or sanctions, thus making them nonbinding. We find that nonbinding peer reviews increase effort and team productivity and do not decrease worker morale. The effects are stronger for low-ability individuals in low-ability teams, where the traditional forces of peer effects may be absent.
引用
收藏
页码:1365 / 1399
页数:35
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