Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Debt

被引：43

作者：

Milidonis, Andreas ^{[1
]}

Stathopoulos, Konstantinos ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cyprus, Dept Accounting & Finance, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus

[2] Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2014年 / 49卷 / 02期

关键词：

STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCING DECISIONS; MATURITY STRUCTURE; CEO COMPENSATION; TAKING EVIDENCE; CREDIT SPREADS; BANKRUPTCY; MANAGEMENT;

D O I：

10.1017/S0022109014000301

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate the risk choices of risk-averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives, unobserved firm and market effects, and debt governance. The impact of CEO risk aversion is economically significant.

引用

页码：453 / 481

页数：29

共 50 条

[41] Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions
Jamshed Iqbal
Sami Vähämaa
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2019, 53 : 1229 - 1258
[42] Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats
Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn
Jiraporn, Pornsit
Lee, Sang Mook
Sarajoti, Pattarake
QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2024, 95 : 268 - 279
[43] Managerial risk taking incentives, corporate social responsibility and firm risk
Chakraborty, Atreya
Gao, Lucia Silva
Sheikh, Shahbaz
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, 2019, 101 : 58 - 72
[44] CSR variability, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats
Likitapiwat, Takakorn
Treepongkaruna, Sirimon
Jiraporn, Pornsit
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2023, 30 (02) : 773 - 790
[45] Managerial incentives for risk-taking and internal capital allocation
Casavecchia, Lorenzo
Suh, Ja Young
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2017, 42 (03) : 428 - 461
[46] Managerial compensation incentives and corporate debt maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R
Hong, Jieying
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2019, 56 : 388 - 414
[47] The Cross-Section of Managerial Ability, Incentives, and Risk Preferences
Koijen, Ralph S. J.
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2014, 69 (03): : 1051 - 1098
[48] Managerial incentives for takeovers
FauliOller, R
Motta, M
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 1996, 5 (04) : 497 - 514
[49] Rationalizing risk aversion in science: Why incentives to work hard clash with incentives to take risks
Gross, Kevin
Bergstrom, Carl T.
PLOS BIOLOGY, 2024, 22 (08)
[50] Lender Monitoring and the Efficacy of Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives
Hong, Hyun A.
Ryou, Ji Woo
Srivastava, Anup
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2021, 96 (04): : 315 - 339

← 1 2 3 4 5 →