Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Debt

被引：43
|
作者：
Milidonis, Andreas [1 ]
Stathopoulos, Konstantinos [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cyprus, Dept Accounting & Finance, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus
[2] Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2014年 / 49卷 / 02期
关键词：
STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCING DECISIONS; MATURITY STRUCTURE; CEO COMPENSATION; TAKING EVIDENCE; CREDIT SPREADS; BANKRUPTCY; MANAGEMENT;
D O I：
10.1017/S0022109014000301
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We investigate the risk choices of risk-averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives, unobserved firm and market effects, and debt governance. The impact of CEO risk aversion is economically significant.
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页码：453 / 481
页数：29
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