Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign
被引:129
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作者:
Wang, Fangjun
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机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
Wang, Fangjun
[1
]
Xu, Luying
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机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
Xu, Luying
[1
,2
]
Zhang, Junrui
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机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
Zhang, Junrui
[1
]
Shu, Wei
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Xian Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
Shu, Wei
[3
]
机构:
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Xian Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
This paper investigates the relationship between political connections and firm value, as well as the moderating effect of internal control under exogenous shocks. By manually collecting 20 staggered downfall events during China's anti-corruption campaign since 2012, we observe that the termination of political connections results in an approximately 2% decline in equity value for private firms at the point of event, and effective internal control attenuates the negative price reaction to the loss of linkage. These findings infer the existence of benefits from maintaining political ties in business operations. Despite the value decline for connected firms, we further conclude that internal control system can be a useful channel of value protection in political shocks. Finally, our results survive a battery of sensitivity tests.
机构:
ZEW, Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, Mannheim, Germany
Paris Sch Econ, Paris, FranceZEW, Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, Mannheim, Germany
Yang, Li
Milanovic, Branko
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机构:
CUNY, Grad Ctr, New York, NY USA
London Sch Econ, London, EnglandZEW, Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, Mannheim, Germany
Milanovic, Branko
Lin, Yaoqi
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机构:
CUNY, Grad Ctr, New York, NY USA
Washington State Dept Social & Hlth Serv, Bellevue, WA 98007 USAZEW, Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, Mannheim, Germany